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IMG-101        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 12-1588 
___________ 
 
DIEGO ANTONIO SACOTO-RIVERA, 
 
   Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A094-241-106) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Dorothy Harbeck 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 22, 2012 
Before:  SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., AND COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 22, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Diego Sacoto-Rivera petitions for review of a decision of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA).  For the reasons below, we will deny the petition for review. 
  2 
 Sacoto-Rivera, a native of Ecuador, entered the United States in December 2001 as 
a visitor.  In December 2008, he was charged as removable for overstaying his admission 
period.  He conceded removability and applied for withholding of removal and relief 
under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime.  He alleged that he feared a Ecuadorean smuggling 
group which was involved with a former ICE agent, Pedro Cintron, who pleaded guilty to 
receiving a gratuity as a public official.  Sacoto-Rivera contended that his wife was 
smuggled into the United States by this group and had “denounced” the leader of the 
group, a man named “Dr. Zumba.”  After a hearing, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied 
relief.  Sacoto-Rivera appealed and filed a motion to remand. 
 The BIA dismissed the appeal and denied the motion to remand.  It determined that 
despite his credible testimony, Sacoto-Rivera had not shown a clear probability that he 
would be persecuted based on a protected ground.  The BIA found unsatisfactory Sacoto-
Rivera’s explanation that his wife did not testify at his immigration hearing because she 
was pregnant.  The BIA concluded that Sacoto-Rivera’s torture claim was speculative.  
The BIA denied his motion to remand, concluding that he had not submitted any material 
evidence that was unavailable at the time of his hearing.  Sacoto-Rivera filed a petition 
for review. 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252.  We may not reverse the BIA’s 
decision unless the record evidence would compel a reasonable fact-finder to conclude 
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that Sacoto-Rivera had met his burden.  I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 
(1992).  To establish eligibility for withholding of removal, Sacoto-Rivera needed to 
demonstrate that it was more likely than not that his life or freedom would be threatened 
in Ecuador on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social 
group, or political opinion.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A).  To be eligible for withholding of 
removal under the Convention Against Torture, he needed to demonstrate that it is more 
likely than not that he would be tortured if removed to Ecuador.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.16(c)(2).   
 Sacoto-Rivera argues that he provided adequate corroboration for his claims for 
withholding of removal and CAT relief.  The BIA concluded that, although credible, he 
did not meet his burden of proof for relief.  The BIA may require credible applicants to 
supply corroborating evidence.  See Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 
2001).  Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4), we may not reverse a determination made with 
respect to the availability of corroborating evidence unless a reasonable trier of fact 
would be compelled to conclude that such evidence is unavailable.  The BIA rejected 
Sacoto-Rivera’s explanation that his wife, who was sitting outside the courtroom, could 
not testify because she was pregnant.  Thus, a witness who could purportedly give 
corroborating testimony was available but Sacoto-Rivera declined to call her.1 
                                                 
1 Sacoto-Rivera argues that the Government has the responsibility to provide evidence to 
support his claim instead of requiring his pregnant wife to testify without an 
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  Sacoto-Rivera asserts that he submitted evidence from his wife’s removal 
proceedings as corroboration.  He contends that his testimony was corroborated by the 
IJ’s and BIA’s decisions in his wife’s proceedings.  However, the IJ in his wife’s case 
concluded that she had not met her burden on proof.  A.R. at 303.  The BIA agreed and 
also concluded that her allegations concerning money paid to undercover ICE agents were 
not relevant.  A.R. at 291. 
 Sacoto-Rivera has not shown that the record compels a finding that his evidence 
was sufficient to support his claim for withholding without corroboration.  Given that his 
 testimony consisted mostly of his recounting hearsay statements made by his wife, it was 
not unreasonable for the BIA to expect corroboration of his claims.  Sacoto-Rivera has 
also not shown that the record compels a finding that he will be tortured if removed to 
Ecuador. 
 With respect to his claim pursuant to the United Nations Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, he has not shown that he falls within the scope of its 
protection.  The Convention provides for protection for witnesses in criminal proceedings 
concerning covered offenses or victims of those offenses.  A.R. at 334-35.  Sacoto-Rivera 
does not allege that he has been a victim or witness in any criminal proceedings covered 
by the Convention.   
 Next, Sacoto-Rivera argues that the IJ should have compelled the Government to 
                                                                                                                                                             
acknowledgement that the testimony she gives will be protected.  Brief at 19.  However, 
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disclose any evidence that could corroborate his claim.  However, he does not explain 
why he could not have obtained any such information on his own.  He did not ask the IJ to 
compel the Government to provide any information, and his counsel admitted that 
“[w]e’re just speculating as to whether this was a sting operation, or it involved, you 
know, corrupt Immigration Officials, you know, with regards to the money, for example, 
that the respondent went and deposited so that his wife could be released.”  A.R. at 191.  
He did not explain how such evidence would support his claim, and his counsel conceded 
that the evidence may not be relevant.    
I think there’s a part of the puzzle that only the Government would have, 
which is what was the Immigration Officers [sic] roles in smuggling the 
wife into the country.  That’s basically it.  Whether it’s relevant?  Whether 
you determine whether we have the information or not, it’s not relevant, 
than that’s fine.  But I just think that that’s something that we can’t provide, 
you know, what exactly happened with the Immigration Officers. 
 
A.R. at 192.  In response, the IJ noted that Sacoto-Rivera could have his wife testify.  The 
Government noted that his wife could make a FOIA request for documents in her file.  
Neither the IJ nor the BIA erred in failing to compel the Government to produce any 
evidence. 
 Finally, Sacoto-Rivera contends that the BIA should have remanded his case to be 
consolidated with his wife’s immigration proceedings.  A motion to remand is the 
functional equivalent of a motion to reopen.  Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 282 
(3d Cir. 2005).  We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion.   
                                                                                                                                                             
Sacoto-Rivera never asked for any protection for his wife’s testimony.  
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Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006).  The BIA noted that Sacoto-Rivera 
had not submitted any material evidence that was not available at the time of his hearing.  
Sacoto-Rivera merely repeats his argument that the Government should be compelled to 
produce corroborative evidence.  The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion to remand. 
 For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
